

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-14 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-14 NSAE-00

NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20

USIA-15 SAJ-01 DRC-01 ( ISO ) W  
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R 290831Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4813

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 6661

DISTO

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA

SUBJECT: NPT EXPORTERS COMMITTEE - SOVIET POSITION

REF: IAEA VIENNA 6570

1. AS MANY ADDRESSEES AWARE, SOVIET UNION WAS NOT INVITED PARTICIPATE IN EXTENDED DELIBERATIONS OF SO-CALLED ZANGGER COMMITTEE OVER THE LAST THREE PLUS YEARS, BUT US HAS ACTED AS INTERMEDIARY IN KEEPING SOVIETS POSTED ON WORK OF THE COMMITTEE AND IN ATTEMPTING SECURE SOVIET ENDORSEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE'S MMORANDA, AS WELL AS SOVIET AGREEMENT EXCHANGE COMMITMENTS WITH OTHER EXPORTER STATES ON MEASURES OF COMMON ACTION. IN COURSE US-SOVIET DIALOGUE IN VIENNA ON QUESTION OF HOW TO SECURE A CONSENSUS OF VIEWS OF NUCLEAR EXPORTER NATIONS ON INTERPRETATION  
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OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE III(2) OF THE NPT,

SOVIETS AND US COLLABORATED ON REFINEMENT AND CLARIFICATION OF THE TRIGGER LIST FOR EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT. THE RESULTING (FROM US POINT OF VIEW) IMPROVED TRIGGER LIST WAS LATER ADOPTED BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EXPORTERS GROUP. SOVIETS HAVE, THEREFORE, ALBEIT INDIRECTLY, HAD AN IMPORTANT INPUT INTO THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GROUP, WHICH ARE NOW TO BE PUBLICIZED IN NEAR FUTURE BY AT LEAST SOME OF THE MEMBER STATES.

2. FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, ZANGGER COMMITTEE HAS BEEN INFORMAL GROUP OF NUCLEAR EXPORTER STATES MEETING TO CONSIDER PROCEDURES IN RELATION TO EXPORTS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, AS WELL AS NUCLEAR MATERIALS, IN LIGHT OF THE COMMITMENT SET FORTH IN ARTICLE III.2 OF THE NPT. THE END RESULT IS TO ASSURE THAT SUCH EXPORTS WILL NOT BE MADE WITHOUT A REQUIREMENT FOR APPLYING IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE RECIPIENT STATE (BY DEFINITION OF A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE NOT PARTY TO THE NPT SUCH AS INDIA OR ARGENTINA). THIS HAS LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE SO-CALLED TRIGGER LIST WHICH SPECIFIES AND DEFINES THE EXPORT ITEMS WHICH WILL REQUIRE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS.

3. THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES IN THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE INCLUDE BOTH PARTIES AND NON- PARTIES TO THE NPT. THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMITTEE MEETINGS HAS BEEN TO REACH AREAS OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING AMONG MEMBERS OF THE GROUP SO THAT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT, THEY WOULD ACCEPT COMMON COMMITMENTS (OR ACT IN ACCORD WITH STATES WHICH HAVE ACCEPTED SUCH COMMITMENTS) TO CREATE CONDITIONS OF FAIR COMMERCIAL COMPETITION IN THE NUCLEAR EXPORT TRADE, AND TO INHIBIT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THE TRIGGER LIST REPRESENTS A MINIMUM BASIS FOR APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE RECIPIENT STATE. SOME EXPORTER STATES, SUCH AS THE US AND USSR, WILL REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS AS A RESULT OF THE EXPORT OF OTHER ITEMS ADDITIONAL TO THOSE INCLUDED IN THE TRIGGER LIST.

4. FOLLOWING JULY 2-3 MEETING OF ZANGGER COMMITTEE AT WHICH DECISIONS WERE REACHED REPORTED REFTEL, US MISSION TOGETHER WITH SECRETARY OF ZANGGER COMMITTEE (JACKSON, UK) MET WITH AMBASSADOR ARKADIEV AND SOVIET MISSION ON JULY 8 TO BRIEF THEM ON  
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OUTCOME OF THE MEETINGS AND TO WORK OUT FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOVIET PARTICIPATION. SOVIETS WERE INFORMED OF ITALIAN RESERVATIONS RE FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE GROUP, AND SHOWED NO PARTICULAR CONCERN. THEY ALSO INDICATED NO HESITATION IN ACCEPTING THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE EC HAD TO WORK OUT SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM OF INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE WITH FRANCE. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE DISCUSSED: (A) SOVIETS WERE ASKED WHETHER THEY READY EXCHANGE COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBER

STATES IN EXPORTERS GROUP IN WHICH THEY WOULD AFFIRM SOVIET INTENTION TO CONFORM TO THE MEMORANDA, IT BEING MADE CLEAR HAT THE COMMUNICATIONS WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED AND WOULD BE TRANSMITTED IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. SOVIET MISSION STATED IT WOULD RECOMMEND USSR RESPOND TO EACH SUCH COMMUNICATION RECEIVED, BUT NOT INITIATE THE EXCHANGE. COMMENT: WE FEEL SOVIETES WISH AVOID EXCHANGING COMMUNICATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, IN CASE SAG GOINS GROUP. THEY WISH RETAIN OPTION TO DECIDE WITH WHOM THEY SHAL COMMUNICATE. END COMMENT. (B) QUESTION WAS RAISED AS TO WHETHER USSR WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SUBSEQUENT AND PERIODIC EXCHANGE OF DETAILED INFORMATION ON EXPORTS (APPLICABLE ONLY TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NPT), WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, AND WHAT PROCEDURES THEY WOULD FOLLOW IN EXCHANGING SUCH INFORMATION. SOVIET MISSION RESPONDED THAT THEY FELT USSR WOULD PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFORMATION; THEY AGREED QUERY MOSCOW ON HOW TO DO IT. (C) QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER EUROPEAN SOCIALIST STATES WHO WERE NUCLEAR EXPORTERS. SOVIET MISSION SAID IT WOULD CONSULT WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND AND POSSIBLE GDR TO ASK THEM TO PARTICIPATE.

5. IN FIRST PARAGRAPH OF "UNABRIDGED" VERSION OF THE

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-11 EUR-25

PM-07 H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-14 NSAE-00

NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20

USIA-15 SAJ-01 ISO-00 DRC-01 /201 W

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R 290831Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4814

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMMBASSY BONN 3735

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 6661

DISTO

ZANGGER COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM ZC(72)/12/REV.3 RELATING TO EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, THERE IS LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE WORK ON THE COMMITTEE. THERE IS A SIMILAR DOCUMENT, CZ(71)/10/REV.6, RELATING TO EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THESE DOCUMENTS, WHICH WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC, WILL SERVE AS BASIS FOR COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WILL BE COMMUNICATED IN DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES MENTIONED ABOVE. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP URGED SOVIETS TO ACCEPT INSERTION OF SENTENCE "INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USSR ALSO TOOK PLACE" IN THIS PARAGRAPH IN BOTH DOCUMENTS. SOVIET MISSION AGREED QUERY MO COW ON THIS POINT OUT WITH AN APPARENT RELUCTANCE. WE EXPLAINED THAT THE MATTER SEEMED HAVE CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE FOR SUCH IMPORTANT EXPORTING COUNTRIES AS FRG AND JAPAN AND HOPED THAT SOVIETS COULD SEE FIT TO ALLOW INCLUSION OF THE SENTENCE. COMMENT: SOVIET RELUCTANCE PROBABLY  
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STEMS FROM SENSE OF PIPER THAT THEY WERE NOT ORIGINALLY INVITED TO JOIN THE GROUP, AND AS WELL CONCERN WITH ASSOCIATING THEMSELVES IN WRITING WITH A GROUPING OF SUCH OBVIOUSLY WESTERN AND CAPITALIST COMPOSITION. PERHAPS INDIA ALSO HAS A BEARING.  
END COMMENT.

6. IN THIS CONTEXT WE ASKED SOVIETS TO CONSIDER NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES ON THE NUCLEAR EXPORTING STATES. WE SUGGESTED SO-CALLED ZANGGER COMMITTEE BE ABOLISHED IN ITS PRESENT FORM, AND A NEW EXPORTERS GROUP BE CREATED, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL EXPORTING COUNTRIES. WE SAID WE HAD NO FIXED IDEAS AS TO HOW FORMAL OR INFORMAL SUCH A GROUP SHOULD BE OR HOW IT SHOULD CONDUCT ITS BUSINESS, BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN A BODY WHICH COULD KEEP NPT ARTICLE III(2) PROBLEMS UNDER CONTINUING REVIEW. PRESENT MEMBERS OF GROUP WERE DESIROUS OF ASSURING PARTICIPATION OF ALL EXPORTERS, INCLUDING SOCIALIST STATES. SOVIET MISSION SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO IDEA, BUT WILL PROBABLY WAIT FOR A FURTHER INITIATIVE FROM US. OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT MISSION NOT SURE OF MOSCOW'S VIEWS.

GUM IN SOCIAL ENCOUNTER WITH AMBASSADOR ARKADIEV ON JULY 23, I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY GETTING RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW TO POINTS WE HAD RAISED. I COULD NOT ASSESS WHETHER THE DIFFICULTY STEMMED FROM SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS OR SIMPLY AN INABILITY TO GET ANY ANSWER AT ALL DURING THE SUMMER DOLDRIMS. HE DID, HOWEVER, ALLUDE TO MOSCOW'S SEEMING GREATER

INTEREST IN ARTICLE III(0) OF THE NPT ( AFEGIARS) THAN IN ARTICLE III(2); IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE WAS NOT GETTING THE GO-AHEAD SIGNALS HE WISHED.AT ONE POINT, HE ALMOST SEEMED TO BE ASKING FOR SOME HELP IN CONVINCING MOSCOW OF THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE TWO PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE III. IN HIS STRONGLY-EXPRESSED VIEW, QUAL ATTENTION HA TO BE GIVEN TO BOTH.

8. WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN NEXT WEEK. IF SOVIETS BY THEN DO NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL ENABLE THM INFORM DIRECTOR GENERAL AND EXCHANGE COMMITMENTS WITH OTHER MEMBERS ON THE GROUP BY AUGUST 15, WE MAY HAVE A REAL PROBLEM. WE MAY IN THAT CASE WISH CONSIDER MAKING A DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW.

9. THIS MESSAGE PASSED TO INFO ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT MOSCOW) FOR INFORMATION ONLY. WE EXPECT SOVIETS ULTIMATELY TO TAKE CONFIDENTIAL

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A COOPERATIVE POSITION ON THIS QUESTION, AND NO CONTRARY DOUBTS SHOULD BE RAISED IN THE MINDS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EXPORTERS GROUP. PORTER

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## Message Attributes

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